Quick Stats
And no, I haven't looked at all the presentations and code on the CD, feel
free to play with whatever you find on it.
Nothing Here, go away
Quick Stats (2)
- 2226 Wireless Clients
- 130 Rouge Access Points
- 215 Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
- 80 Denial of Service Attacks
- 12G in / 1.2 G out
- 836 ARP/IP Spoofs
Yes, I left my laptop back at the hotel!!
NMAP and Its Many Uses
Fydor (author of nmap) gave a presentation, and distributed a new verions of nmap with a few new features.
- ARP Scanning
- XML output of OS fingerprinting
- Idle Scans '-sI' (scan using another computer)
- Service fingerprinting (does ssl services too!)
jason@foobar[2:22pm](217)> ./nmap -sT -sV -p 993,22,80 -v portnoy
[...]
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.1 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp closed http
993/tcp open ssl/imap UW imapd 2004.357
[any material that should appear in print but not on the slide]
Phil Zimmerman
- Phils next big thing is (drum roll please), Secure VOIP
- It's for the mac (applause), and is written in python! Need I say more?
- Its based on the open source project, Shtoom, which can be found here:
http://divmod.org/projects/shtoom
- Looks like he might be trying to shop it to VC's so there is nothing to
play with yet....
Unicornscan
- Unicorn scan can be thought of as a port scanner on steroids. Very kewl.
- Distrubuted (3 processes; master, sender and recv) can be be on 3
differnt machines!
- pcap logging
- db backend
- Can be found here:
http://www.unicornscan.org/main.html
Trust Transience
Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking
- Coerce an existing ssh connection to supply you with
another connection.
- Allow this connection to be connected to any arbitrary
endpoint.
- This connection is pre-authenticated!
- Simple, single python script.
Hacking Coffee Shops
Bypassing Authenticated Wireless Networks
- Tool that passively sniffs the network looking for wireless clients
- Reconfigures your wireless interface with someone elses MAC/IP !
- Works under linux only currently, its called pickupline
- I've put the tarball at:
http://dsd.lbl.gov/~jason/DC13
And no, I haven't personally used this one! (yet!)
Pickupline Example
Physical Bypass
Physical Security Bypass Techniques
- Concentrated on Biometric
- Leave the devices alone (for the most part) and concentrate on the
backend server ;-)
- Insert bogus data (extra users, extra fingers for known
user, etc.)
- Wires are usually easy to get to ;-) (card swipe $10 on ebay)
XML holes
- XPath Injection
- Use CDATA
- XML injection
<UserRecord>
< UniqueID>12345</UniqueID>
<Name>Henry Ackerman</Name>
<Email>hackerman@bad.com</Email>
<UniqueID>0</UniqueID><Email>hackerman@bad.com
</Email>
<Address>123 Disk Drive</Address>
<ZipCode>98103</ZipCode>
<PhoneNumber>206-123-4567</PhoneNumber>
</UserRecord>
SOAP Problems
- WSDL are EVIL!
- A WSDL exposes ALL the interfaces of your program, are you sure you
removed that debug method?
- XML & SOAP allow you to create very complex (and deeply nested)
documents, that have to be parsed before being handed to the
application. This allows for easy DOS attacks
- .NET creates and publish your WDSL when you use visual studio!
Visual Event Analyis
Visual Security Event Analyis
- AfterGlow: tool to process events into directed graphs
- GraphWiz tools (dot and neato) to graph 'interesting' events
- Hand afterglow CSV list and presto....
Jul 10 04:06:13 pinky snmptrapd[20843]: 192.168.1.1:
Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 4 days, 17:41:16.95,
SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.3093.1.1.0 = STRING:
"@in 61.235.154.92 50868 192.168.1.102 1026."
% awk '{print $19","$22","$21}' fw.log | sed 's/\.\"//g' | \
sort | uniq | perl afterglow.pl -c color.properties | \
neato -Tgif -o /tmp/fw.gif"
Visual Event Analyis
The color.properties file is simple:
# sources (check for non-routable addrs
color.source="yellow" if ($fields[0]=~/^192\.168\..*/);
color.source="greenyellow" if ($fields[0]=~/^10\..*/);
color.source="lightyellow4" if ($fields[0]=~/^172\.16\..*/);
color.source="red"
# events
color.event="orange" if ($fields[1]<1024)
color.event="yellow"
# targets
color.target="lightblue"
# lines
color.edge="green"
|
Recovery from Rootkit
Surgical Recovery from Kernel-Level Rootkit Installations
- A kernel-level rootkit (such as SUCKit), installs itself into kernel
memory, and changes the System Call Table (SCT) to point to the rootkits
trojan functions (sys_open, sys_close, etc.).
- Most common way to recover is/was reformat and reinstall.
- This talk demostrated how to repair those tables, so that the point back to
orignal functions, without any downtime, using the /dev/kmem interface on
linux.
Shadow Walker
How to hide.
Fairly simple concept, very messy to really do!
The only way a scanner can
check memory is to ask the OS for a pointer to memory, and walk through it
looking for nasty strings. If we compromise the OS, we can make it
hand back whatever memory we want.
This was demo'd on a Windows box, but I belive that same thing can/could be
done on unix, and perhaps much easier....
And now
Putting my madz hax0r skillz to use ....